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2Zusammenfassung
Es besteht weitgehend Einigkeit darüber, dass inzidentelles Lernen bewusstes Wissen über 
eine  sequenziell  strukturierte  Regelhaftigkeit  erzeugen  kann,  auch  wenn  die  zu  Grunde 
liegenden Lernprozesse nur ungenügend verstanden sind.  Ob jedoch Sequenzlernen auch 
„implizit“ oder unbewusst erfolgen kann, ist umstritten. Fortschritte in diese Frage sind von 
Untersuchungen zu bewusstem und unbewusstem Lernen zu erwarten, die vor dem Hinter-
grund übergreifender Bewusstseinstheorien erfolgen. Rünger und Frensch (2008a) zeigen, 
wie  „bewusstes  Sequenzwissen“  in  Rückgriff  auf  die  „global  workspace“-Theorie  des 
Bewusstseins definiert und operationalisiert werden kann. Im Rahmen dieser Theorie wird 
„inferenzielle  Promiskuität“  als  zentrales  funktionales  Merkmal  bewusster  mentaler 
Repräsentationen  betrachtet.  Rünger  und  Frensch  (2008b)  überprüfen  eine  zentrale 
Vorhersage  der  „unexpected  event“-Hypothese,  einer  Theorie  zur  Entstehung  bewussten 
Wissens  in  inzidentellen  Lernsituationen.  In  einer  Serie  von  Experimenten  wurden 
unerwartete  Ereignisse  durch  Unterbrechungen  des  inzidentellen  Lernprozesses 
experimentell induziert. In Übereinstimmung mit der „unexpected event“-Hypothese fanden 
die Autoren, dass sich die Verfügbarkeit bewussten Sequenzwissens erhöhte. Rünger, Nagy 
und Frensch (in Druck) untersuchen schließlich die Funktion bewussten Sequenzwissens im 
Kontext  eines  Rekognitionstests.  Die  empirischen  Befunde  deuten  darauf  hin,  dass 
bewusstes Sequenzwissen die epistemische Grundlage für rationale Urteile im Gegensatz zu 
intuitiven oder heuristischen Urteilen darstellt.
Schlagwörter: 
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3Abstract
There is  a  general  consensus  that  incidental  learning  can  produce  conscious  knowledge 
about a hidden sequential regularity, even though the underlying learning mechanisms are 
still poorly understood. By contrast, whether sequence learning can also be “implicit” or 
nonconscious is a matter of intense debate. Progress can be achieved by grounding research 
on conscious and nonconscious learning in larger theoretical frameworks of consciousness. 
Rünger and Frensch (2008a) show how “conscious sequence knowledge” can be defined and 
operationalized  in  reference  to  global  workspace  theory  of  consciousness  that  depicts 
“inferential  promiscuity” as the functional hallmark of conscious mental representations. 
Rünger and Frensch (2008b) test a central prediction of the unexpected-event hypothesis—a 
theoretical  account  of  the  generation  of  conscious  knowledge  in  incidental  learning 
situations. In a series of experiments, unexpected events were induced experimentally by 
disrupting the incidental learning process. In line with the unexpected-event hypothesis, the 
authors  observed  an  increased  availability  of  conscious  sequence  knowledge.  Finally, 
Rünger, Nagy, and Frensch (in press) explore the function of conscious sequence knowledge 
in the context of a sequence recognition test. The empirical results suggest that conscious 
sequence knowledge provides the epistemic basis for reasoned—as opposed to intuitive or 
heuristic—judgments.
Keywords:
sequence learning, consciousness, unexpected event, recognition
41 Overview
In  the  following I  summarize  a  dissertation  project  on the  generation  of  conscious 
knowledge  about  an  incidentally  experienced  sequential  regularity  and  its  subsequent 
application in the context of a recognition test. The dissertation comprises four manuscripts. 
Frensch and Rünger (2003) review empirical findings from the implicit learning literature 
and  spotlight  two  important  theoretical  issues.  First,  how  to  define  and  operationalize 
“implicit” or nonconscious learning is a matter of continuing debate. Second, the mecha-
nisms  that  produce  conscious  knowledge  during  incidental  learning  are  still  poorly 
understood. In an attempt to meet these theoretical challenges, Rünger and Frensch (2008a) 
define  and  operationalize  “conscious  sequence  knowledge”  on  the  basis  of  a  broader 
theoretical view of consciousness that regards conscious mental contents as inferentially 
promiscuous. In Rünger and Frensch (2008b) we explore a theoretical framework for the 
generation of conscious knowledge in incidental learning situations—the unexpected-event 
hypothesis. Finally, Rünger, Nagy, and Frensch (in press) test the prediction that conscious 
sequence knowledge provides the epistemic basis  for reasoned (as opposed to heuristic) 
decisions in a sequence recognition test.
2 Implicit Learning
Learning  about  environmental  regularities  is  a  popular  research  topic  in  cognitive 
psychology. An important reason for the unabated interest is the controversial claim that 
such learning can be “implicit” or nonconscious. The term “implicit learning” was coined by 
Arthur Reber (1967). In a seminal study on artificial grammar learning (AGL) Reber asked 
his participants to memorize sets of letter strings such as TPPTS or VXVPS. Unbeknownst 
to participants, the strings were generated by traversing through a finite-state grammar that 
is shown in Figure 1. After the study phase participants were informed that the strings they 
had just memorized conformed to a complex set of grammatical rules. They then received 
new strings that were either grammatical or not, and were asked to make a grammaticality 
judgment for each string based on the strings they had studied earlier. Reber found that on 
average 69% of the classification decisions were correct. He proposed that classification was 
based on abstract rules that participants had formed implicitly during the initial study phase, 
that is, without using conscious, verbalizable strategies. The acquired rules themselves were 
regarded as “tacit” knowledge—knowledge that is, to a significant degree, unavailable to 
conscious inspection (Reber, 1989).
5Another important tool to study implicit learning is the the serial reaction time (SRT) 
task (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). In the training phase with the SRT task participants respond 
to a target that appears on a computer screen in one of four horizontally arranged locations. 
Each location is assigned to a response key, and participants are asked to respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible by pressing the key that corresponds to the current target location. 
The target locations on successive trials follow a systematic pattern that is continuously 
repeated  throughout  the  training  phase.  Although  participants  are  not  informed  of  this 
sequential regularity, they nevertheless learn something about the deterministic structure of 
the task: When, at some point during the training phase, the systematic response sequence is 
replaced by random sequences, response times (RTs) increase. This increase provides an 
indirect, performance based measure of sequence learning.
Several  early  studies  with the SRT task reported that  participants  showed sequence 
learning on the performance measure, even though they had very little conscious knowledge 
about  the  sequential  regularity.  For  example,  Nissen  and Bullemer  (1987)  observed RT 
savings for structured relative to random responses in six amnesic patients who claimed to 
be completely unaware of a sequential regularity. This finding was confirmed by Reber and 
Squire (1994). In their study nine amnesic patients showed normal sequence learning on the 
performance measure, but were severely impaired in direct tests of conscious knowledge 
such  as  verbal  report  or  recognition  of  the  sequence.  Finally,  Willingham,  Nissen,  and 
Bullemer (1989) demonstrated that implicit  sequence learning also occurs in individuals 
without memory impairment. They identified a subgroup of participants who could neither 
report the sequence nor generate it in a prediction task, yet showed greater RT savings over 
Figure 1. Finite-state grammar used by Reber (1967). A grammatical string is generated by following the 
arrows through the grammar, starting at node S0 and exiting at node S0'. Letters are picked up along the 
way.
6training with the systematic sequence than participants in a control group that were trained 
on random sequences.
The early findings reported in the implicit learning literature lent credence to the view 
that memory is composed of functionally separate systems with distinctive neural underpin-
nings  (e.g.,  Cohen & Squire,  1980;  Gabrieli,  1998;  Tulving,  1985;  Schacter & Tulving, 
1994). In particular, the distinction between declarative and nondeclarative memory (e.g., 
Squire & Zola, 1996) seemed to capture the pivotal finding well that individuals can adapt 
to the statistical structure of their environments without being conscious of the underlying 
statistical contingencies. 
However, the multiple-systems view of conscious and nonconscious learning did not 
stand uncontested. Arguably the most influential critique was formulated by Shanks and St. 
John (1994). Shanks and St. John concluded from an extensive review of the literature that 
the  existence of  dissociable  conscious  and nonconscious  learning  systems had not  been 
established convincingly. Their critique was, first and foremost, a methodological one. The 
standard demonstration of nonconscious learning requires a dissociation between an indirect 
performance  measure  that  indicates  learning,  and  a  direct  test  that  indicates  a  lack  of 
conscious knowledge (cf. Erdelyi, 2004). However, in order to accept this dissociation as 
evidence for nonconscious learning, one needs to presume that the direct test is sensitive 
enough  to  detect  all  conscious  knowledge  that  might  have  been  expressed  on  the 
performance  measure  (the  exhaustiveness criterion;  Reingold  &  Merikle,  1988).  When 
viewed in this light, empirical dissociations reported in the literature either did not withstand 
scrutiny (see Shanks & St. John, 1994), or they simply failed to replicate. For example, both 
Reed  and  Johnson  (1994)  and  Destrebecqz  and  Cleeremans  (2001)  reported  sequence 
learning on the indirect test and chance performance on a recognition test, but subsequent 
replication  studies  by  Shanks  and  collaborators  (Shanks  &  Johnstone,  1999;  Shanks, 
Wilkinson,  &  Channon,  2003)  provided  no  evidence  of  dissociation.  Implicit  learning 
therefore remained an elusive phenomenon. 
3 On How to Define Conscious Sequence Knowledge
In a summary of key findings reported in the literature on AGL and sequence learning, 
Frensch and Rünger (2003) highlighted some of the unresolved theoretical problems. Most 
notably, how to define and operationalize implicit learning continued to be a moot issue. As 
noted above, many researchers consider learning to be implicit if the products of learning 
are  not  available  to  consciousness  (see  e.g.  Frensch,  1998,  for  an  alternative  view). 
7However, the resulting problem of having to distinguish conceptually between conscious 
and nonconscious knowledge is typically not acknowledged. Instead, researchers resort to 
operational definitions of consciousness and conscious knowledge. Conscious knowledge, 
operationally  defined,  is  knowledge  that  can  be  expressed  on  some  direct  test  that  the 
researcher  deems  adequate—appealing  to  intuition  and  common  practice  rather  than 
theoretical considerations. Not surprisingly, evidence for the existence of implicit learning 
varies  with  the  particular  direct  test  employed.  For  example,  there  is  little  doubt  that 
participants can acquire knowledge with the SRT task that they find difficult or impossible 
to express verbally (Frensch & Rünger, 2003; Shanks, 2005). Consequently,  with verbal 
report as the principal measure of conscious knowledge, implicit sequence learning appears 
to be a valid concept. In contrast, when recognition or sequence generation are used as direct 
tests,  one  typically  finds  that  the  expression  of  sequence  learning  on  the  performance 
measure is accompanied by above-chance performance on the direct tests.  
Rünger and Frensch (2008a) recount the interpretational problems that arise from the 
use of different direct tests to determine the epistemic status of knowledge. These problems 
are not unique to the domain of implicit learning. Particularly striking dissociations between 
different direct tests occur in individuals with neuropsychological impairments that affect 
the integrity of consciousness. Consider, for example, patient DB described in Weiskrantz 
(1997). Surgical removal of a small tumor in primary visual cortex (V1) left him with a 
large scotoma in his left visual hemifield. When an experimenter flashed a circular patch of 
lines in DB's blind field, he typically reported to have no visual experience, yet he was 
virtually perfect at forced-choice guessing the orientation of the line gratings. In DB's case, 
two  direct  tests  of  visual  processing  yield  contradictory  results.  If  forced-choice 
discrimination is regarded a valid test of DB's conscious knowledge of line orientation, then 
one needs to conclude that this information was consciously available to DB. By contrast, if 
one regards verbal reports as an adequate measure of the contents of consciousness, then the 
conclusion is that DB had no visual experience.
Drawing on neuropsychological evidence, experimental findings, and neurocomputa-
tional models,  Rünger and Frensch (2008a) propose to abandon the common practice of 
defining consciousness operationally in favor of a conceptual definition of consciousness in 
terms of global availability or accessibility. This proposal is rooted in several theoretical 
accounts  of  consciousness  that  depict  global  availability  to  cognitive  processes  as  the 
functional hallmark of consciousness (Block, 1995; Baars, 1988, 1997; Dennett, 1991, 2001; 
8Dehaene & Naccache,  2001).  For example,  in Dennett's  Multiple  Drafts  model  multiple 
cognitive processes operate in parallel,  competing for control of behavior. Most of these 
processes have only short-lived effects, but some get perpetuated and spawn continuing, 
widespread effects, including verbal reports of the contents of consciousness. According to 
Block  (1995),  a  mental  state  is  access  conscious  if  its  content  is  “inferentially 
promiscuous”—that is, if it can be used as a premise in reasoning and for the rational control 
of speech and action.
With consciousness thus defined, Rünger and Frensch (2008a) turn to the question of 
what a participant in an experiment with the SRT task may, or may not, become conscious 
of. We argue that sequence learning can have multiple conscious and nonconscious effects. 
First, a participant can become conscious of the repeating sequence of response locations in 
the training phase. For example, a participant can come to know consciously that response 
location 1 was followed by locations 6 and 4. Moreover, executing a systematic response 
sequence might engender conscious feelings of perceptual-motor fluency or familiarity (e.g., 
Buchner,  Steffens,  Erdfelder,  &  Rothkegel,  1997;  Fendrich,  Healy,  &  Bourne,  1991; 
Perruchet  & Amorim,  1992;  see also Norman,  Price,  & Duff,  2006,  and Koriat,  2000). 
Presumably, these feelings mediate conscious knowledge of the presence of a regularity that 
can, in principle, exist without conscious knowledge of the order of response locations that 
defines the regularity (cf. Dienes & Scott, 2005). In other words, a participant might be able 
to report that responses followed a systematic pattern, but she may be at loss when being 
asked to describe the specific series of response locations.
Our analysis of the different effects of sequence learning leads us to identify “conscious 
sequence knowledge” with conscious knowledge of the serial order of response locations. 
Moreover, we argue that verbal reports, unlike recognition and generate tasks, provide a 
sensitive and valid measure of conscious sequence knowledge. Recognition and generate 
tasks,  though  commonly  employed  in  research  on  sequence  learning,  fail  to  meet  the 
exclusiveness  criterion  formulated  by  Reingold  and Merikle  (1988):  They  are  not  only 
sensitive to conscious sequence knowledge, but to nonconscious and derivative conscious 
effects of sequence learning (e.g., perceptual-motor fluency). 
4 The Generation of Conscious Sequence Knowledge
A second focus in Frensch and Rünger's (2003) review concerns the learning mech-
anisms  that  create  conscious  knowledge of  regularities  in  incidental  learning  situations. 
Traditionally,  researchers have not paid particular attention to conscious knowledge as a 
9possible  outcome of  incidental  learning,  as  most  theoretical  and  empirical  efforts  were 
directed at characterizing learning that is implicit. In order to encourage a shift in theoretical 
perspective, we outlined possible relations between learning processes, behavioral changes 
due to learning, and consciousness of the products of learning. 
Rünger  and  Frensch  (2008b)  and  Rünger,  Nagy,  and  Frensch  (in  press)  delineate 
theoretical  accounts  that  can  be  applied  to  the  question  of  how  conscious  sequence 
knowledge is generated. Despite Shanks and St. John's (1994) critical review, the multiple-
systems view of memory continues to feature prominently in the sequence learning literature 
(e.g.,  Keele,  Ivry,  Mayr,  Hazeltine,  &  Heuer,  2003;  Reber  &  Squire,  1994,  1998). 
Willingham (1998; Willingham & Goedert-Eschmann, 1999) proposed that conscious and 
nonconscious  sequence  learning  can  proceed  in  parallel.  Conscious  learning  requires  a 
strategic process—akin to high-level problem solving—that selects and sequences spatial 
targets that are represented in allocentric space. Implicit learning, on the other hand, relies 
on target representations in egocentric space that are inaccessible to consciousness. Implicit 
learning is achieved through tuning of a sequencing process that is engaged whenever a 
sequence of spatial targets is executed. 
The competing single-system view rejects the notion of multiple memory systems (e.g., 
Shanks,  2005;  Shanks  &  St.  John,  1994;  Perruchet  &  Vinter,  2002).  According  to 
Cleeremans  and  collaborators  (e.g.,  Cleeremans,  2006;  Cleremans  &  Jiménez,  2002) 
sequence learning is a mandatory consequence of performing a sequentially structured task 
Figure 2. Schematic depiction of the color-matching version of the SRT task. On each trial during the 
training phase a manual response was determined by the small target rectangle at the bottom of the screen 
that matched the color of the large probe rectangle at the top. The six target rectangles were mapped to 
six spatially compatible response keys. Although the colors of the rectangles changed pseudorandomly 
from trial to trial, participants kept pressing the same sequence of response keys.
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such as the SRT task. Learning produces, over time, increasingly strong, stable, and distinct 
representations  of  the  underlying  sequential  regularity.  With  increasing  quality  of  a 
representation  comes  a  greater  influence  on  the  behavior  of  the  individual,  but  the 
representation does not necessarily become available to consciousness. For knowledge to be 
conscious, it has to be re-represented in a metarepresentation (Cleeremans, 2006; cf. Dienes 
&  Perner,  1999).  Cleeremans'  framework  thus  demarcates  conscious  and  nonconscious 
knowledge according to the presence or absence of relevant metaknowledge. Nevertheless, 
the  framework  qualifies  as  a  single-system  account  of  sequence  learning  because 
metarepresentations  are  produced  by  the  same  learning  mechanisms  in  the  same 
representational systems as their first-order counterparts (Cleeremans, 2006).
Frensch, Haider, Rünger, Neugebauer, Voigt, and Werg (2003) advanced a theoretical 
framework for the generation of conscious knowledge in incidental learning situations that 
is  compatible with the multiple-systems view of memory.  According to  the unexpected-
event hypothesis, behavioral effects of nonconscious learning can trigger explicit reasoning 
processes  that  generate  conscious  knowledge  about  the  underlying  task  structure. 
Specifically,  we  assume  that  nonconscious  learning  can  produce  unexpected  events—
behavioral effects  that are discrepant with an individual's  current  expectations about  the 
learning situation. For example, an individual might notice that her responses in the training 
phase with the SRT task have become surprisingly fast and fluent. Such unexpected events 
are believed to trigger an intentional search for their likely cause. A successful search then 
leads to discovery of the sequential regularity and its subsequent verbal report. 
In a series of experiments Rünger and Frensch (2008b) tested the central prediction that 
unexpected events can trigger the generation of conscious, reportable sequence knowledge. 
The  test  consisted  of  a  comparison  of  the  amount  of  reportable  sequence  knowledge 
generated in two experimental conditions: Participants completed a training phase with the 
SRT task that either did or did not contain experimentally induced unexpected events.
We used a modified version of the SRT task in which the response on any given trial is 
determined  by  the  screen  position  of  one  of  six  horizontally  arranged  rectangles  that 
matches  the  color  of  a  centrally  presented  probe  rectangle  (see  Figure  2).  Our  color-
matching version retains the key feature of the standard SRT task: Responses on successive 
trials in the training phase followed a repeating pattern. Specifically, the colors were chosen 
pseudorandomly in such a way that the same sequence of the six response locations was 
continuously  repeated  (e.g.,  ...-4-2-1-5-6-3-4-2-1-5-6-3-4-...).  In  the  control  condition 
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participants performed ten blocks of trials with the SRT task. Immediately after the training 
phase participants were asked to verbally describe the regular response pattern. 
In order to quantify the sequence knowledge contained in a verbal report, we introduced 
a novel scoring procedure. In a first step, we determined the structural overlap between a 
verbalized  sequence  and the  actual  training  sequence  in  terms  of  the  number  of  shared 
sequence  segments  (i.e.,  pairs,  triplets,  quadruples,  and  quintuples).  In  a  second step,  a 
verbal  knowledge score  was  assigned based  on  the  likelihood of  achieving  a  particular 
structural match (e.g., two shared pairs and one shared triplet) by random guessing—with 
lower guessing probabilities affording higher verbal knowledge scores.
The critical experimental manipulation consisted of the induction of unexpected events 
during  the  training  phase  with  the  SRT  task.  We  predicted  that  the  experience  of 
experimentally  induced  unexpected  events  would  increase  the  availability  of  reportable 
sequence  knowledge  after  the  training  phase.  Unexpected  events  were  produced  by 
disrupting the learning process with the systematic training sequence. At different points 
during  the  training  phase  participants  were  either  transferred  to  randomly  determined 
response locations or to an alternate systematic sequence that had the same basic structure as 
the training sequence. For example,  in one experiment the training phase comprised ten 
blocks of trials with the training sequence (e.g., 1-6-3-4-2-5) and an additional four blocks, 
distributed over the training phase, that contained a different sequence (e.g, 1-3-5-2-4-6). In 
another experiment we used the same ordering of regular blocks and transfer blocks, but 
response locations on the four transfer blocks were structured randomly.
We expected that the shift to random sequences or to an alternate sequence would bring 
about performance decrements (e.g., slower RTs and an increased error rate). If a participant 
noticed this unexpected change in her performance, she would engage in a search for an 
explanation  to  the  unexpected  event.  This  search  then  leads  to  the  discovery  of  the 
sequential regularity—at least in subset of participants. 
Our  results  partially  confirmed  the  unexpected-event  hypothesis.  Most  importantly, 
participants who were shifted to a systematic transfer sequence generated significantly more 
reportable knowledge about the training sequence than participants in the control condition. 
In  contrast,  participants  who received interpolated random transfer  blocks  generated the 
same amount of reportable sequence knowledge. The lack of an effect in the latter condition 
can  be  explained  as  follows:  Presumably,  the  shift  to  randomly  determined  response 
locations  produced unexpected  performance decrements  that  triggered a  search  for  their 
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cause. However, the search could not possibly lead to discovery of a regularity when it was 
carried  out  during  random  transfer  blocks.  In  other  words,  the  facilitative  effect  of 
unexpected events critically depends on the successful execution of the search process. This 
hypothesis was tested in two follow-up experiments. 
In the first experiment the same experimental manipulation was used that had led to an 
increase in reportable sequence knowledge earlier: Four transfer blocks were interpolated 
during  the  training  phase  that  contained  an  alternate  systematic  sequence.  The  only 
procedural change was that on transfer blocks, participants now had to perform a demanding 
secondary task in addition to the SRT task. With the secondary task we intended to prevent 
the search for an underlying regularity on transfer blocks. The second experiment served as 
a  control  condition  to  ensure that  the  effect  of  the  secondary task  was  confined  to  the 
transfer blocks. The training phase included the same four dual-task transfer blocks, with the 
only  difference  that  response  locations  were  structured  randomly.  Crucially,  in  both 
experiments  an  intentional  search  that  would  lead  to  discovery  of  a  regularity  was  not 
possible on transfer blocks. We therefore expected to observe the same amount of reportable 
sequence knowledge that we obtained in the original control condition. This prediction was 
born out by the data.
In summary,  the pattern of results  in a series of experiments with a color-matching 
version of the SRT task confirmed the central prediction of the unexpected-event hypothesis. 
Unexpected disruptions of the learning process with the SRT task increase the availability of 
reportable sequence knowledge—provided that the search for cause of the unexpected event 
is not obstructed.
5 On the Function of Conscious Sequence Knowledge
A psychological taxonomy derives its validity from that fact that its taxa are associated 
with qualitatively different and psychologically interesting behaviors. This, of course, is also 
true  for  the  distinction  between conscious  sequence  knowledge,  nonconscious  sequence 
knowledge,  and  additional  conscious  effects  of  learning  such  as  feelings  of  fluency  or 
familiarity. Rünger; Nagy, and Frensch (in press) explore the function of conscious sequence 
knowledge in the context of a recognition test: The predictions of a single-system model 
about  the  relationship  between  RT  priming  and  recognition  are  contrasted  with  the 
predictions of a competing dual-process model.
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According  to  Shanks  and  collaborators  (Shanks,  2005;  Shanks  & Perruchet,  2002; 
Shanks et al., 2003) RT savings to systematic response locations and participants' ability to 
discriminate learned and new sequences in a recognition test are expressions of the same 
underlying memory representations that were generated during the training phase with the 
SRT task.  A computational  model  is  presented  according  to  which  individual  RTs  and 
recognition judgments can be decomposed into a linear combination of a memory strength 
variable  and  an  error  term.  The  memory  strength  variable,  referred  to  as  “familiarity”, 
reflects  the  degree to  which  a  participant  has  learned a recognition  test  sequence.  Let's 
assume  that  a  participant  first  executes  a  test  sequence  and  then  makes  a  recognition 
judgment about the sequence. In the Shanks model the speed of executing the test sequence 
and the subsequent recognition judgment are both determined by the same familiarity value. 
In addition, each type of response is associated with a unique error component.
The following predictions can be derived from the Shanks model. First, RT priming 
scores  (i.e.,  RT differences  to  old  and new test  sequences)  and  recognition  scores  (i.e., 
differences in recognition judgments to old and new sequences) should be correlated across 
participants because both measures express the identical difference in familiarity for old and 
new test sequences. Second, if measurement error is statistically controlled for, RT priming 
and recognition should be perfectly correlated because the difference in familiarity between 
old and new sequences is the only systematic determinant of the correlation.
The alternative dual-process model belongs to a class of models that posit two distinct 
cognitive processes, often labeled  familiarity1 and  recollection, as the basis of recognition 
judgments (e.g., Atkinson & Juola, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1994). 
Like Buchner and colleagues (1997) we assume that participants can derive a recognition 
judgment about a test sequence from feelings of perceptual-motor fluency: A sequence that 
can be performed fluently appears familiar and thus receives an “old” rating. When using 
the fluency heuristic, a participant who exhibits large differences in RT to old and new test 
sequences should also discriminate well between old and new sequences in her recognition 
judgments. Thus, RT priming and recognition can be expected to correlate. However, the 
correlation does not reflect a common underlying knowledge base as assumed in the Shanks 
model, but a causal effect of processing fluency, indexed by RT priming, on recognition. 
1 Note  that  in  the  literature  on  recognition  memory,  familiarity denotes  a  conscious  feeling  of  having 
encountered a particular stimulus in the past, whereas in the Shanks model, familiarity refers to the strength of 
memory representations.
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We further endorse Buchner et al.'s (1997) position that participants can supplement the 
fluency  heuristic  with  a  recollective  process.  Specifically,  a  participant  with  conscious 
sequence knowledge can generate a recognition judgment by consciously matching the test 
sequences  against  the  recollected  training  sequence.  This  conscious  comparison  can 
contribute  to  recognition  performance  independently  of  the  fluency  heuristic.  However, 
consciously  comparing  sequence  representations  requires  time  and  mental  effort.  We 
therefore  predicted  that  when  recognition  judgments  have  to  be  made  quickly  and 
intuitively, a conscious comparison is no longer feasible and the rapidly available fluency 
heuristic alone determines recognition judgments. In this case, recognition and RT priming 
should be perfectly correlated after controlling for measurement error. By contrast, when a 
participant is asked to deliberate her recognition decisions, we expected RT priming and 
recognition to dissociate. In this case, participants' verbal knowledge scores are assumed to 
predict  recognition  independently  of  RT  priming  because  the  availability  of  conscious 
sequence  knowledge  is  the  prerequisite  for  the  postulated  comparison  between  test 
sequences and the training sequence.
In order to test the predictions of the two models, we conducted an experiment with the 
color-matching  SRT  task.  Participants  performed  ten  blocks  of  trials  that  contained  a 
continuously repeating response sequence. After the training phase we assessed the available 
reportable sequence knowledge and administered a recognition test under both speed and 
accuracy conditions. In the speed condition, a response deadline forced participants to make 
recognition judgments quickly and intuitively. In the accuracy condition, participants were 
required to carefully deliberate their decisions. RT priming scores were derived from the 
speed of executing old and new test sequences.
Recognition and RT priming scores were submitted to a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). The CFA consists of two components—a measurement model and a structural model. 
The purpose of  the measurement  model  is  separate  true  differences  in  RT priming and 
recognition  from  measurement  error.  The  structural  model,  in  turn,  represents  the 
characteristics of true RT priming and recognition—means, standard deviations and, most 
importantly, the correlation between true priming and recognition. 
The  model  was  fit  separately  to  data  from  the  accuracy  condition  and  the  speed 
condition. In the speed condition we obtained a correlation between true RT priming and 
recognition  that  did  not  deviate  significantly  from  unity.  By  contrast,  in  the  accuracy 
condition  the  correlation  was  estimated  at  .79,  and  fixing  the  correlation  to  1  led  to 
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significant decrease in model fit. In order to account for the attenuated correlation in the 
accuracy condition, reportable sequence knowledge was added to the structural model as a 
second predictor of recognition performance. We found that both RT priming and reportable 
knowledge had a significant effect on recognition in the extended structural model.
To summarize: In the speed condition true RT priming and recognition were perfectly 
correlated. This finding is consistent with both the Shanks model and the competing dual-
process model. The attenuated correlation in the accuracy condition, however, violates the 
prediction  of  the  Shanks  model  and  points  to  an  additional  influence  on  recognition 
judgments.  In  line with the assumptions  of the dual-process  model,  reportable sequence 
knowledge predicted recognition performance independently of RT priming. This finding 
suggests a function of conscious sequence knowledge: It enables an individual to reason 
about the structural correspondence between the test sequences and the training sequence 
(cf.  Block,  1995).  Without  conscious  knowledge  about  the  structure  of  the  training 
sequence, participants need to rely on their intuitions about the test sequences. In this case, 
decision are presumably based on evoked feelings of fluency and familiarity.
6 Summary and Outlook
How  can  we  distinguish  between  conscious  and  nonconscious  cognition?  Most 
researchers  agree  that  cognitive  processes  themselves  are  inaccessible  to  consciousness. 
Nobody knows from direct experience how the brain manages to produce the name that 
belongs to the person on the cover of the latest issue of People magazine. By contrast, the 
epistemic status of representations that are produced and shaped by cognitive processes is a 
moot issue. The standard approach to the problem in the implicit learning literature is to 
contrast performance on an indirect test of learning with performance on direct tests such as 
recognition or generate tasks. A prominent view is that as long as a direct test indicates 
knowledge, learning has to be considered conscious (Shanks, 2005; see also Holender, 1986, 
and Holender & Duscherer, 2004). On the other hand, several authors have pointed out that 
direct  tests  may  not  be  exclusively  sensitive  to  conscious  knowledge,  that  is,  they  are 
potentially contaminated by the effects of nonconscious knowledge (e.g., Berry & Dienes, 
1993; Cohen & Curren, 1993; cf. Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990). If this is true, then 
above-chance  performance on  a  direct  test  would  be  possible  in  the  absence  conscious 
knowledge.
Who is wrong and who is right? The answer depends on the theory of consciousness 
endorsed. Unfortunately, few attempts have been made in the implicit learning literature to 
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anchor research in conceptual frameworks of consciousness. One exception from the rule is 
the  work  of  Dienes  and  collaborators  (e.g.,  Dienes  &  Perner,  1999,  2002).  Adopting 
Rosenthal's (1986) higher-order thought theory, Dienes and Perner delineate various ways in 
which knowledge can implicit. Importantly, the (in-) adequacy of the available tests for the 
assessment of conscious and nonconscious knowledge follows directly from their theoretical 
framework. 
Rünger and Frensch (2008a) conceptualize consciousness in terms of global availability 
to  cognitive  processes  and  conclude  that  verbal  reports  provide  a  sensitive  and  valid 
measure of conscious sequence knowledge. We further demonstrate that the observation of 
unexpected events can precipitate the generation of conscious sequence knowledge with the 
SRT task (Rünger & Frensch, 2008b). Finally, we explore the functional role of conscious 
sequence  knowledge in  the  context  of  a  recognition  test  (Rünger,  Nagy,  & Frensch,  in 
press). The finding that reportable sequence knowledge predicts recognition performance 
when participants are required to deliberate their decisions lends credence to the view that 
conscious propositional knowledge provides the epistemic basis for reasoned as opposed to 
intuitive decisions. 
Much remains to be understood about the processes that generate conscious knowledge 
in incidental learning situation. In particular, unexpected events need to be operationalized 
in such a way that their occurrence during task performance can be measured directly, and 
the search process that is  assumed to generate conscious structural knowledge has to be 
characterized  in  considerably  greater  detail.  Finally,  the  function  of  conscious  sequence 
knowledge needs to be explored in task contexts other than recognition tests in order to 
validate  our  distinction  between  the  different  conscious  and  nonconscious  effects  of 
incidental sequence learning.
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